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SEX AND WITCHCRAFT, AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY, JOINTLY-TAUGHT COURSE
IN COMPARATIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT*
Peter Sevareid**
The spring term, 1988, marked the tenth consecutive year that three
of us at Temple University, Philadelphia, have taught a course officially
listed as "Comparative Law, Dispute Settlement," but known to a decade
of students as "Sex and Witchcraft." Peter Rigby, Professor of Anthro-
pology, Robert Kidder, Professor of Sociology, and I have given this
course to a class of students from the three disciplines. Since the instructors
are still on speaking terms-a rare event in academic life,' since many of
* This article is based on remarks given at an INTWORLSA Workshop on "Teaching About
'Law' in the 'Development' of Third World Countries" held in Los Angeles, January 3rd, 1987.
** Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
. Perhaps why we still speak to each other, and perhaps why the course has worked for so
long, is that all of us-though trained in three different disciplines-have the same scholarly interest
in "law in action" and have all lived in the Third World and done field research in Third World
legal systems. Peter Rigby was born in India of British parents and is now a citizen of Uganda. He
was educated at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and received his Ph.D. in Anthropology
from Cambridge where he studied under anthropologists Meyer Fortes and Sir Edmund Leach. Before
coming to Temple he taught at the University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and before that he was
Senior Lecturer and Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Makerere, Kampala, Uganda.
In addition to articles, he has written two books: CATTLE AND KINSHIP AMONG THE GoGo: A S3MI-
PASTORAL SOCIETY OF CENTRAL TANzANIA, Cornell University Press, 1969: and PERSISTENT PASTORALISTS,
NOMADIC SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION, Zed Books (London), 1985.
Bob Kidder did his doctoral research for Northwestern University in India in courts and law
offices. He has recently done field work in Japan and has been editor of LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW,
an American journal of empirical legal research. He is also the author of a college text on the
Sociology of Law which uses many examples drawn from our course, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIETY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY, Prentice-Hall, 1983.
After graduation from Georgetown University Law School and a short stint in a Washington
law firm, I was sent by the International Legal Center to teach at the Kenya Institute of Administration.
Since coming to Temple I have taught during summers at the University of Ghana and the University
of Tel Aviv and I have also lived in a northern Liberian village studying customary law. I have
written on African law and legal education.
A further reason our course has existed is that it is not one course but three. It is a joint course
practically but not officially, de facto but not de jure. There are separate listings in the offerings of
the Departments of Anthropology and Sociology and the School of Law. Each listing indicates as
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our graduates have told us at alumni gatherings that this course altered
their thinking about the nature of the legal process, and since a majority
of our course readings deal with changing peasant societies, a description
of the course and our experiences with it may be of interest to readers
of this issue of Third World Legal Studies.
The theme for this issue is the content and the pedagogical method-
ology of courses about "law" in the "development" of Third World
countries. On one level our course is a survey of the literature by lawyers,
anthropologists and sociologists on the way small-scale groups handle
problems which would be dealt with by members of the legal profession
in Western, industrialized countries. For example, we study the handling
of a land dispute among the Warusha in Tanzania [Class 2] and watch a
film of the compromise distribution of the meat of a hartebeeste by the
!Kung (Bushmen) of Namibia (South West Africa) [Class 3]. The Appendix
to this article is a listing of the materials used in our course.] Although
a majority of our class readings depict dispute settlement in the Third
World, we do cover dispute settlement by autonomous groups within the
First World [the Amish, Class 17, and Israeli kibbutzim, Class 9]. We
also discuss alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in a California divorce
lawyer's office [Class 20] and in an English lay magistrate's court [Class
24]. The California and English examples of ADR might be classified as
informal dispute resolution by "nonautonomous" members of the domi-
nant ethnic group of First World countries. Throughout the course, these
various forms of informal dispute resolution are compared with the formal
model of Western, court-dominated, adversarial litigation.
While on one level our course is a survey of the literature on com-
parative dispute settlement by small groups, on another it is about "law"
in the "development" of Third World countries. At the outset the issues
of "what is law?" and "what do we mean by development?" are raised.
Class I begins with the film "Bitter Melons" about the /Gwi (Bushmen)
of Botswana (then the Bechuanaland Protectorate). On first viewing it is
the instructor only the one from that department and we each give and grade the exams of our own
students. These are three courses that just happen to meet together and use the same materials. A
true joint course would have required the approval of course content by the faculties of the three
departments. It would have taken years, perhaps forever, to obtain such approval, academic parochialism
being what it is. Arts and Sciences faculties regard law schools as "trade schools" and law faculties
view the teaching materials of other departments as "insufficiently rigorous." Like the Japanese
approach to "free trade," faculties are publicly in favor of interdisciplinary offerings but they erect
insurmountable barriers.
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the story of unclad little people who gather fruit, dig up roots, hunt
game, sleep a lot under shade trees, and dance with their children in the
emptiness of the scrub desert. Not a court house or an overdressed lawyer
is in sight. Can there be any "law" here?
Our first class discussion brings out the fact that the conduct of the
/Gwi is governed by norms. Their behavior is not as haphazard as it
looks. For example, captured small animals need not be shared outside
the nuclear family, but large game must be shared. This norm of behavior
is a rule of "law" for the /Gwi. And if there is conflict about how
different norms of meat distribution should operate, the larger community
settles the dispute. Settlement is illustrated by a film in Class 3 about a
related group, the !Kung, where the issue was which extended family had
the right to the meat of a hartebeeste-the family of the hunter who shot
and wounded the animal or the family of another hunter who found the
carcass several days later. No courtroom is visible, but under a tree a
group of men talk the matter through to an acceptable compromise.
Throughout the course we are trying to spot "law" and the "legal
process" in the groups we watch 2 or read about. Students, particularly
2. As the Appendix makes clear, we use many films and television tapes in the course. There
is a rich library of visual materials on our subject and over the years we have found many that work
well in class. Our students, children of the Television Age, respond well to visual materials.
The films and television tapes are a pleasant surprise for the law students in the class. They
have recently become used to courses where the only "visual" aspect is the lecturer's expressionless
face and where the reading materials come in either brown or blue covers and are without pictures.
Anthropology and sociology students, on the other hand, are used to classes with films and television
tapes and their texts are filled with pictures, sometimes even pictures in color. Many of the non-law
students in our class had assumed before taking the course that law must be a "difficult" field of
study because the texts they had seen were so visually plain.
Our most successful classes have been those where the reading before class tied directly to a
film or a television tape. The Togo film "Sherea" in Class 9 is an example. The study guide gives
a detailed summary of the case as well as extensive ethnographic background. Having read the study
guide before class, students watch the film and this adds to and reinforces the reading. The class
discussion which follows has always been one of our best, the collective visual experience of watching
the film gives a common ground for discussion and also gives self-confidence for expressing their
opinions to students from these three, very different disciplines.
When I first began to teach in Kenya our course materials were English law text books and our
method of instruction was lecture. For Africans, straight from up-country mission schools, it was
hard to relate to abstract legal principles applied to situations they had never encountered. How
could they be expected to grasp the significance of "tortious liability" resulting when the door of a
"tube station" closed too rapidly on a "top hat"? We began to use cases from the Kenya courts
which the students read before class and we thus had a common ground, not for lecturing but for
open discussion. A case in which a Landrover, driven by a man who had had too much Tusker beer,
ran over the banana trees of the plaintiff's shamba (small farm) was a situation Kenya students
could understand. (See my Teaching by the Socratic Mathod in Kenya, 2 KENYA INSTITUTE OF ADMIN.
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law students, assume that this should be easy to do. But they soon realize
that it is a difficult task: it is a jurisprudential task. Beginning law
students unconsciously accept a Natural or a Divine law jurisprudential
philosophy. These hold (to oversimplify) that basic rules, basic notions
of equity and fairness, apply to all men.3 A course in Comparative Dispute
Settlement must be one that shows how these universal rules are applied
by different cultures. The "legal process" of all societies must be one of
applying "legal" rules ("law") based on universal metaphysical principles
to specific disputes.
We have thus found that teaching about "law" in the development
of Third World countries creates two questions, not just the one question,
"what is law?" The first question is what is the structure, what is the
process in a given society, for applying "legal" rules? The second question
is whether the rules applied have any relevance outside the specific small
group being studied, do the rules have any basis in forces that govern the
behavior of all men? Even when we have successfully spotted the mech-
anism a particular group uses for solving conflicts that are similar to the
conflicts dealt with by legal professionals in the West, 4 the results reached,
J. 23 (1973).) In a similar way, study guides followed by films of the same cases give a common
ground for discussion to interdisciplinary American students, many of whom have never been to the
Third World.
3. See Laura Nader & June Starr, Is Equity Universal, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD's LEGAL
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Ralph A. Newman ed. 1973).
4. A traditional approach to studying comparative legal systems, especially non-Western ones,
is to define "law" and then, using that definition as a tool, to investigate other cultures. We have
found it more effective to identify conflicts that are similar to the conflicts handled by lawyers in
the West as our method of comparison than to try to agree upon a definition of "law." More than
halfway through the course [Class 18], we read the "What is law?" chapter from our only text, E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL's THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (1954,
1972). At the beginning of this chapter (p. 20) Hoebel quotes Max Radin: "Those of us who have
learned humility have given over the attempt to define law." (Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51
HARV. L. R. 1145 (1938).) Despite Radin's warning, Hoebel goes on to define "law": "A social
norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of
physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting."
(p. 28). Such a definition contains the three essential elements for Hoebel of "privileged force,
official authority, and regularity... that modern jurisprudence teaches us we must seek when we wish
to identify law." (Id.)
We have found several things wrong with Hoebel's definition of "law." First, in leading up to
his own definition, he attacked the definitions of "law" by others as too all inclusive, as being as
applicable to "toilet training" as to law. (p.20) Why Hoebel's definition of "law" does not apply
to "toilet training" escapes us. This surely is the type of definitional trap that Max Radin was
talking about in the law review article cited by Hoebel. Second, Hoebel's definition centers more on
law as "legal process" than on law as a body of "rules." For Hoebel a norm is "legal" if it is
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the decisions in individual cases, often do not make sense to our students.
The solutions are not "logical." The legal rules and the way they are
applied in conflicts are not readily understood.
Students find that once we get more specific than vague notions of
"fairness",' the rules that are applied vary dramatically with each society.
To use anthropological terminology, the rules applied to factually similar
cases in two cultures will differ because the structure of the societies and
the functions of their institutions differ. For example, take two cases
involving sexual access to a wife. One case involves two brokers in a New
York municipal bond office where one has had an affair with the other's
wife. The second case involves frequent sex by one ilmurran (warrior)
ultimately sanctioned by force. A process using force determines which of many rules are legal rules.
But we have found that there are always two questions in studying comparative law: a question of
law as process and a question of law as rules. Hoebel's definition forecloses the separate existence
of law as a body of rules, i.e. as a body of abstract principles. Hoebel's definition denies the
possibility that there are rules relevant to the central issues in conflicts which exist but which will
never be backed up by force.
And thirdly, we have found specific definitions of "law" so hopelessly culture-bound as to
make them next to useless in a comparative course. The urge to define law is particularly Western.
That urge is rooted in notions of progress (discussed below) and in a belief in the supremacy of
"science." An example is the following from legal sociologist Donald Black: "[It is possible to have]
a scientific analysis of legal life as a system of behavior. The ultimate contribution of this enterprise
would be a general theory of law, a theory that would predict and explain every instance of legal
behavior." (D. Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, in Ti SocIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW (D.
Black & M. Mileski eds. 1973) emphasis in the original.) A definition of law thus becomes the tool
whereby a general theory of law is found and used to predict every instance of legal behavior,
however diverse the different cultures being studied. The three of us who have taught this course are
very skeptical of the utility of definitions of law and of the validity of universal legal principles. If
one social class has more wealth than another, legal behavior is often the same in very different
cultures. But outside of similar legal outcomes when a society has more than one social class, we
have found few generalizations about law that have held up cross-culturally. We agree with anthropologist
Franz Boas (1858-1942) who, at the end of his long career, concluded that there was no hope of
discovering general or particular laws akin to those of the physical sciences which could predict social
behavior. "The phenomena of our science are so individualized, so exposed to outer accident, that
no set of laws could explain them. . . . [I]t seems to be doubtful whether valid cultural laws can be
found." (F. BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 257 (1940).
5. The vague notions of "fairness" that I have in mind are close to Aristotle's concept of
justice as particular justice or fairness, specifically distributive justice. It does not involve rectificatory
justice (procedural due process). See PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 333-7 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross, eds. 3rd
ed. 1986). Unless one social class is manipulating the dispute settlement mechanism to its advantage
[Classes 9, 10 and 11], we have seen few examples in our course of procedural due process violations.
Once the norms are understood in the context of the culture of a particular society, the "trials" are
"fair." Traditional societies are often models of procedural due process, no one is in a hurry:
opposing parties get to speak their minds at length, and the case does not end until a consensus of
the community is reached, until all are "satisfied." (See my A Post-coup Court in Nimba, 9 LIBERIAN
STUD. J. 93 (1980-81).)
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with the wife of another ilmurran of the Ilparakuyo Maasai of Tanzania. 6
On a general level both cases involve the question whether it is "fair" to
have intercourse with another man's wife. More specifically, the issue in
one case is how much; in the other, whether once is too much. The
Ilparakuyo permit, even encourage, sexual access to a fellow ilmurran's
wife or wives, provided such access is not abused. To understand this
requires both a knowledge of Ilparakuyo norms and a theoretical frame-
work with which to assess this knowledge.7
6. The llparakuyo are a similar group to the Warusha in Class 2.
7. In teaching the course over the years we have found a marked difference in the approach
to the "facts" of a case between law students on the one hand and sociology and anthropology
students on the other. Initially law students are not skeptical about the presentation of facts. They
are used to reading appellate court opinions and have been taught to concentrate their scrutiny on
the opinion's reasoning, not on whether the facts are correct. Because they have an unconscious
Divine or Natural Law jurisprudential philosophy, they believe that a properly operating legal system
can achieve justice and fairness if it "logically" applies the appropriate value-free, universal legal
rule to the "objective" facts of a case. (This is the Nineteenth Century "finding the law" approach.)
Law students study the case materials in our course to see whether the dispute settler has reasoned
in the appropriate syllogistic manner. They are thrown off balance when judges in a different culture
do not reason syllogistically. Such reasoning and the result in a case are not "logical" for law
students.
Law students are used to "legal reasoning" or "thinking like a lawyer." This form of reasoning,
this mode of argument, is syllogistic. It comes in three parts - the major premise, the minor premise
and the conclusion. "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." (In our
example (to oversimplify): men commit adultery if they sleep with another man's wife; the municipal
bond broker slept with his fellow's wife; therefore, the bond broker committed adultery.) Most
commonly, "thinking like a lawyer" is reasoning by analogy from a parallel case or cases to the
present, objective "facts." This reasoning is expressed in the syllogistic format. "[W]hat is ...
involved is not logical deduction in the strict sense but the rational use of analogy, whereby a case
is compared with like and unlike, so as to determine the 'proper' scope of a legal rule. No analogy
is compelling in a purely logical sense as leading to a necessary conclusion; but as a practical matter
human beings do reason by analogy, and find this in many instances a useful way of arriving at
normative or practical decisions." (LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1142 (5th Ed. 1985), emphasis in original.) "Like to like is probably
the value norm most firmly rooted in the democratic society of today." (Id. at n. 12, quoting F.
SCHMIDT, SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 195 (1957).
A basic question in our course is whether syllogistic reasoning, and the linking of like to like
by analogy, is universal with all men or a particular thought pattern of the West. Some hold that it
is universal: "The assumption that people in different cultures actually think differently in some
inherent way is untenable. [T]he difference among traditions derives not from variance in inherent
thinking patterns, but from differences in what is thought about. [T]here is no prima facie reason
to abandon the hypothesis that the logical form of rationality is the same around the world. Rather,
the divergence between cultures lies in the traditional concerns of rationality, and therefore, the
experiences to which logic is applied." (Kasulis, Reference and symbol in Plato's Cratylus and Kukai's
Shojijissogi, 32 PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST 404-5 (1982), quoted in J.C. SMITH & DAVID N.
WEISSTUB, THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 7-9 (1983). Emphasis in original.) If the reasoning process is
different in different cultures, then law students must not only learn different norms to understand
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One theoretical framework would be to apply Marxist theory to
understand the culture of the Ilparakuyo. (Marxist theory is not the only
framework we use in our course. We try out a number of jurisprudential
theories.) An historical materialist analysis can explain this case and why
the Maasai have successfully resisted the modernizing pressures of English
colonial administrators, proselytizing missionaries and socialist develop-
ment experts. Marx held that a people's culture, their philosophical beliefs
and their behavioral customs, are determined by their economic base.
Their mode of production, their way of obtaining the goods and services
necessary to sustain life, determines how they relate to each other-the
relations of production. The relationships between men and women are
different in a pastoralist society from those in a captitalist one because
the manner in which goods are produced is different. When the wealth
of a society is generated by jointly-owned reproducing cattle, the ways in
which men and women relate to each other are not the same as in a
capitalist society where the means of production, land or a manufacturing
business, are owned by one group and worked by another. In capitalist
communities one class owns the means of production: another class works
for a wage but does not own the results of its production, the fruits of
its labor.
Marx held that capitalism would change into socialism and then into
communism, just as feudalism in Europe had evolved into capitalism. He
a case, but they must also learn different patterns of thought. On the other hand, even if "the
logical form of rationality" is employed in all cultures, law students still must understand why-in
an analogy-a like is similar to another like, why this case is similar to another case previously
decided in that culture. Law students must still understand the norms of a society to understand the
"logic" of their application.
Sociology and anthropology students approach cases differently. They are taught that one must
first decide on a theoretical framework before he can talk about the "facts." One cannot evaluate
whether these facts are the appropriate facts unless he acknowledges a particular theoretical framework
with which to assess the facts. The differences in the approach of law students and the approach of
students from sociology and anthropology are really differences in theories of knowledge. The
epistemological approach of law students is that of empiricists, the truth can be obtained by deduction
from "objective" facts. The other students in the class have a dialectical approach, considering all
the possible facts in a given case, who can say that the facts presented in the report of the case are
the appropriate ones? For them it is impossible to learn anything without a theory, a theoretical
framework, to use as a tool to select the appropriate facts in a case. Anthropology and sociology
students want to talk about theory first and then the particular case. Law students, on the other
hand, do not question the presentation of the facts and they look, as I have said, for the reasoning
of the dispute settler. The approach by law students may be particularly "Western." This observation
has relevance for the discussion of "development" and "progress." (See references to these subjects
in the text.)
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also speculated on the structures of societies prior to feudalism, called in
the Marxist literature "pre-capitalist formations." Men had first been
hunters and gatherers. Then they began to herd cattle and at a later time
became cultivators. These early cultivators had a communal society not
dominated by class conflict. For Marx this "Germanic mode of produc-
tion" was not unlike the communist society he felt was historically
inevitable after the fall of capitalism and the end of socialism. Because
private ownership was limited or non-existent in the Germanic mode,
people reacted to each other as equals because they shared the common
fruits of production. There was no class conflict as all were of the same
class. (Current research now holds that cultivators evolved after hunter-
gatherers had become cultivators. It was at a later time that some
cultivators became pastoralists, a specialized offshoot who traded their
meat products for crops grown by neighboring subsistence farmers.)
Marx's speculations on pre-capitalist formations were contained in his
notebooks and were not fully developed. These notebooks, the Grundrisse,
were written in 1857 and 1858 but were first published in a limited edition
only in 1939 and 1941, and a full edition was not available till 1953.8
Peter Rigby of our class maintains that, unfinished as it was, Marx's
analysis was essentially correct in understanding how pastoralist society is
structured and how pastoralists think about property and relate to each
other.
The seeds of strife and class conflict arise when men spend their days
working land and planting crops. To get more crops and therefore more
wealth, each farmer needs more land to cultivate. When there is a scarcity
of good land, each eyes the land of his neighbor as necessary for his own
increased production. Competition ensues and with it notions of individual
ownership and private property. Because the base of production is agri-
culture, a "superstructure" of politics and laws develops which in turn
reinforces the structure of that society. It is the mode of production which
determines the relations of production.
Pastoral society is different. Land for grazing is not scarce. Increased
wealth comes from a healthy and actively reproducing herd. Alone, no
one nuclear family can tend all their cattle and protect them from
8. The Grundrisse was published in a limited edition in two volumes in German by Foreign
Language Publishers, Moscow. The first volume appeared in 1939 and the second in 1941. The first
full edition was published in German by Dietz Verloag in Berlin in 1953. It was not until 1973 that
Penguin Books, Baltimore, published a complete English translation by Martin Nicolaus. The subtitle
was "Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy."
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predators. It takes cooperation; it takes communal effort. The structure
of Ilparakuyo society does have divisions of labor. Women milk and tend
small animals such as sheep and goats. Boys tend young cattle. It is the
mature ilmurran, the warriors, who herd cattle on nomadic journeys in
search of grazing. The ilmurran are drawn from the whole society and
are formed in groups called "age-sets." Under the guidance of elders, the
ilmurran are given charge of the main means of production for the
Ilparakuyo, the reproducing cattle. Though each family will "own" in-
dividual cattle, such ownership is meaningless without the cooperation of
the larger community. The superstructure of the base, the laws of the
community, foster sharing among age-mates. An ilmurran has free use of
the personal property of his age-mates-in modern Tanzania items like
watches and sunglasses-even, if not abused, sexual access to an age-
mate's wife or wives.
Students cannot understand how the Ilparakuyo settle their disputes
until students understand Ilparakuyo customs and laws. The Ilparakuyo
notion of such a basic concept as private property is dissimilar to ours.
Their laws are different because their mode of production, their means
of gaining a livelihood, is different. Thus a theoretical framework, in this
example a Marxist analysis, is necessary to understand the norms of a
different culture. Armed with this theoretical understanding, students then
can understand the norms of the culture and in turn understand why the
results of a case that has factual similarities to a case in another culture
came out differently. The age-mate abusing sexual access to his fellow's
wife will be treated in a different way in Ilparakuyo dispute settlement
from the way the municipal bond broker who slept with his office-mate's
wife will be treated by an American court.
Besides the "what is law?" question, we deal extensively with the
problem of law in the "development" of Third World countries. "What
do we mean by development?" is a constant question. Our one text,
Hoebel's The Law of Primitive Man, equates "development" with "pro-
gress," as indicated by its title. For Hoebel societies are "evolving"
towards "greater complexity" and "higher" forms of law. "The trend of
the law, like the trend of society and culture [,] has been one of steadily
increasing complexity. The study of this process is the aim of the evolu-
tionary method. . . ."9 This has overtones of Social Darwinism. 0 To
Hoebel "[t]he society and legal life of the Ashanti [Class 10] are obviously
9. Hoebel, supra note 4, at 289.
10. See generally, R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1944).
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further evolved than those of the Eskimo [Class 5]." 11 The Eskimo operate
by "rudimentary law" in a society characterized as "primitive anarchy"' 2
while the Ashanti "stand on the threshold of civilization."' 3
Hoebel's idea of progress has a counterpart in one of the theories of
Law and Development, namely "legal engineering." This theory was
described by Wolfgang Friedmann (when he wrote about the role and the
function of lawyers in the Third World): "These countries have an
overwhelming need for rapid social and economic change. Much of this
must express itself in legal change in constitutions, statutes and adminis-
trative regulations.' '1 4 Once an efficient national system of public and
private law is in place, the economy of these countries will "take off."' 5
This assumes that "law" and "legal systems" are essentially the same in
all human societies. It assumes that if those in "primitive anarchy" would
only operate their legal systems in the efficient way that the West has
done, then they too will "stand on the threshold of civilization." They
may even get rich.
We question the idea of progress from the first day of class. We read
an article that maintains that the shift from hunter-gathering to plant
cultivation was the worst mistake in the history of the human race.' 6 New
evidence indicates that hunter-gatherers had better diets, lived longer and
were more free of disease than cultivators. Hunter-gatherers had more
leisure time because it took fewer hours to obtain a balanced diet of
protein and other nutrients. They were less susceptible to mass diseases
such as plague because they lived in scattered bands rather than grouped
together in crowded settlements. Hunter-gatherers did not suffer bouts of
mass starvation as did cultivators when a single staple such as potatoes
or corn failed. With this new evidence in mind, can we say that hunter-
gatherers today are less "progressive" than cultivators? Do they have "an
overwhelming need for rapid social and economic change"? And are
hunter-gatherers at a lower stage of "legal progress" than other societies?
We contrast the peaceful dispute resolution of the /Gwi and !Kung
hunter-gatherers who live in the deserts of southern Africa [Classes 1 and
11. Hoebel, supra note 4, at 289.
12. Id. at 67 (capitalization changed).
13. Id. at 211.
14. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 429 (5th ed. 1967) (emphasis supplied). In jurisprudential
theory, legal engineering owes much to Roscoe Pound's "Social Engineering," a particularly American
concept. Id. at 336-44.
15. See generally, W.W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1960).
16. Diamond, The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race, DISCOVER, May, 1987,
at 64.
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3] with the lack of legal redress experienced by poor consumers of mass
produced products in the United States. We do this when we view a
television tape by Laura Nader [Class 19]. In the tape, buyers of faulty
autos and washing machines are ignored by the manufacturers if the
warranties have run out. And the relatively small price of the product
does not justify invoking expensive litigation. We ask whether the "civi-
lized" and highly "progressive" society of the U.S. really has a "higher"
form of law than "primitive" peoples? At least in terms of access to
legal process, it is doubtful whether societies have "evolved" to "higher,"
more "fair" procedures.
We also question whether two societies at the same "stage" of
"development" necessarily have the same "laws" and the same "legal
process." The violence of the Eskimo, who are hunters and who live in
an equally harsh environment [Class 5] as that of the /Gwi and the
!Kung, is contrasted with the peaceful dispute resolution of the latter
groups. To us it is questionable whether similar sparse environments or
similar modes of food production produce similar laws and legal systems.
We make the same comparisons between the Albanians [Class 14] and
the Amish [Class 17].
Besides dealing with issues of "progress" and "development," we also
treat a number of other issues which I shall mention briefly. We question
the whole notion of whether some societies and hence their legal systems
are more "complex" than others. Are the "contract" rules of the Trob-
riand Islanders [Class 8] less intricate than the "deals" between American
manufacturers and their dealers [Class 20]? Are there really differences
in legal rules and the kinds of legal process in small societies where people
deal with each other in many different capacities (societies with "multi-
plex" relationships) [Class 4] than in societies where people may encounter
each other only once in a lifetime (societies with "simplex" relationships)
[Class 24]? Another question is what effect do religious beliefs have on
legal rules and the dispute settlement process [Classes 16, 17 and 27]? To
what extent is litigation a form of entertainment and a substitute for
limited warfare [Classes 5, 13, 14 and 151? What happens when one
society imposes its laws on another [Classes 9, 10, 11, 21, and 27]? And
finally, what happens to rules and dispute resolution when a society has
one class of citizens with more power than another class [Classes 11 and
26]?
I hope that I have demonstrated that Comparative Dispute Settlement
is an infinitely rich subject. The longer we have taught this course, the
more questions we have found. Over the years we have made changes in
the course materials: some materials did not work well in class; others
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have made in a stronger manner the points we wished to achieve. And
good readings and films have been produced that were not in existence
when we first began the course. Students often had mixed motives when
they signed up for our course. Some literal-minded law students were
looking for a course which conveniently fitted into their schedule between
Remedies and Commercial Transactions. ("I don't see how Comanche
wife-stealing rules will be on the Multi-State" [bar examination].) Some
law students had once taken a course in Anthropology or Sociology and
were still curious. Others had wanted a career in Art History but were
settling for a specialty in shopping center leases and were seeking relief
from the monotonous reading of American appellate cases. Some students
in the College of Arts and Sciences were hoping that this course would
show them what law school was like just in case a career as an academic
anthropologist or sociologist did not work out. Whatever their initial
reasons, many have told us after the course was over that we had
fundamentally changed their view of law and the legal process, that a
course which they had assumed would be the least "practical" ended up
being very useful for law practice or whatever they did. It was useful
because it gave them a new theoretical understanding. They had now
formed their own conscious jurisprudential view of law and dispute
settlement. As teachers, we could not ask for a better result.
APPENDIX
COMPARATIVE LAW: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Professors Robert Kidder, Peter Rigby and Peter Sevareid
Temple University




E. Adamson Hoebel: The Law of Primitive Man (1954, 1972) (H)
Victor H. Li, Law Without Lawyers (1977) (L) Film Study Guides to
"Ax Fight," "Meat Fight," "Argument About a Marriage," and "Bitter
Melons" (DER: Documentary Educational Resources) Recommended (but
not required):
Simon Roberts: Order and Dispute, An Introduction to Legal An-
thropology (1979)
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Robert L. Kidder: Connecting Law and Society (1983) [Sociology of
Law]
CLASSES
1. Film: "Bitter Melons" (30 minutes) (Kalahari Bushmen); study
guide to film (DER); and Jared Diamond, "The Worst Mistake in the
History of the Human Race" (from Discover, 1987).
2. P.H. Gulliver: Kadume's case (from Social Control in an African
Society: A Study of The Arusha: Agricultural Masai of Northern Tan-
ganyika, 1963) (Warusha-Tanzania).
3. Films: "Meat Fight" (14 minutes) and "Argument About a Mar-
riage" (18 minutes) (both films about Bushmen in Southwest Africa);
study guides to both films (DER).
4. Max Gluckman, Reasonable Man (from Order and Rebellion in
Tribal Africa, 1963) (Barotse - Zambia).
5. Film: Knud Rasmussen: "The Wedding of Palo" (72 minutes) (on
the Eskimos); "The Eskimo: Rudimentary Law in Primitive Anarchy"
(H: ch. 5).
6. "The Ifugao: Private Law in Northern Luzon" (R.F. Barton's
work on the Philippines) (H: ch. 6).
7. "Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: Plains Indian Law in Devel-
opment" (American Indians) (H: ch. 7).
8. "The Trobriand Islanders: Primitive Law as Seen by Bronislaw
Malinowski" (Melanesia) (H: ch. 8).
9. Film: "Sherea" (24 minutes) (Togo); study guide to the film; and
Richard D. Schwartz: "Social Factors in the Development of Legal
Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements" (from 63 Yale Law
Journal, 1964).
10. "The Ashanti: Constitutional Monarchy and the Triumph of
Public Law" (Ghana) (H: ch. 9).
11. Film: "The Cows of Dolo Ken Paye" (31 minutes) (Kpelle -
Liberia); James L. Gibbs, Jr.: "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model
for the Informal Settlement of Disputes" (from 33 Africa, 1963); and
Taylor, Walton and Young: Mark, Engels and Bonger on Crime and
Social Control" (from The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of
Deviance, 1978).
12. G.S. Snell: Criminal law and Procedure Among the Nandi (from
Nandi Customary Law, 1954) (Kenya); Rigby: "Punishment, An African
View?" (unpublished).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1986
13. Film: "Dead Birds" (83 minutes) (New Guinea warfare); readings
on the Dani (from K. Heider: Grand Valley Dani, 1979).
14. Margaret Hasluck: "The Albanian Blood Feud" (from Paul
Bohannan, ed., Law and Warfare, 1967); G. Talese: from Honor Thy
Father, 1971 (Mafia).
15. Film: "Ax Fight" (30 minutes) (Yanomano Indians of Southern
Venezuela); study guide to film (DER); and Louis Auchincloss short story
"From Bed and Board" (from Power of Attorney, 1963).
16. "Religion, Magic and Law" (H: ch. 10).
17. Guest lecturer: John A. Hostetler (Temple Professor of Anthro-
pology, Emeritus); film: Old Order Amish: A People of Preservation (30
minutes); selected readings from Hostetler: Amish Society, 1980.
18. Hoebel: "What is Law?" (H: ch. 2).
19. Television Tape: Little Injustices (60 minutes) (American con-
sumer complaints and Zapotec (Mexican) dispute settlement)) by Laura
Nader; Stuart Macaulay: "Lawyers and Consumer Protection Law" (from
14 Law and Society Review, 1979).
20. Stuart Macaulay: "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study" (from 28 American Sociological Review, 1963); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner: "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's
Office" (from 20 Law and Society Review, 1986).
21. Gregory Massell: "Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change
in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia" (from 2 Law
and Society Review, 1968); and Robert L. Kidder, "Toward an Integrated
Theory of Imposed Law" (from S. Burman & B. Harrell-Bond, eds., The
Imposition of Law, 1979).
22. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett: "The Implications of Apol-
ogy, Law and Culture in Japan and United States" (from 20 Law and
Society Review, 1986).
23. Film: Courts and Councils: Dispute Settlement in India (30
minutes); film guide (from South Asian Area Center, University of Wis-
consin - Madison); and Robert L. Kidder: "Courts and Conflict in an
Indian City: A Study in Legal Impact" (from 11 Journal of Common-
wealth Political Studies, 1973).
24. Television Tape: Inside the Jury Room (60 minutes) (Wisconsin);
J. Van Velsen: "Procedural Informality, Reconciliation, and False Com-
parisons" (from Max Gluckman, ed., Ideas and Procedures in African
Customary Law, 1969) (English lay magistrate's court).
25. Guest Lecturer: Professor Jan Ting (Temple Law School); tele-
vision tape: Chinese Theft Case (60 minutes); Victor H. Li: Law Without
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Lawyers.- A Comparative View of Law in China and the United States
(1977).
26. Garrett D. Dorsey: "Toward A Marxist Understanding of Law"
(unpublished, 1985, copy at Temple Law School).
27. Film: A film by Peter Rigby of a Dispute Settler in a Trance in
Kampala (Uganda); Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, "An Adultery Dispute with
No Legal Remedy" (from "Special Issue on Disparity between Law and
Social Reality in Africa," Kroniek Van Afrika, 1975 (Afrika-Studiencen-
trum, Leiden) (Sierra Leone); and Peter Sevareid: "A Post-coup Court
in Nimba" (from 9 Liberian Studies Journal 1980-81).

